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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the effects of fiscal policies on rates of interest
and wealth in the world economy. Uncertainty concerning the length of life
yields an equilibrium in which private and social rates of discount differ and
budget deficits exert real effects. It is shown that a current budget deficit
(resulting from a tax cut) raises world rates of interest. On the other hand
the direction of the effect of an expected future deficit on the short—term rate
of interest depends on whether the country is having a surplus or a deficit in
its current account of the balance of payments. If it runs a deficit in the
current account then the short—term rate of interest rises and vice versa; the
future rate of interest, however, must rise. It is also shown that budget
deficits raise domestic wealth and lower foreign wealth and thus result in a
negative transmission. In the long run, a higher steady—state value of
government debt raises the steady—state world rate of interest but its effect on
the long—run value of foreign wealth is ambiguous.
The effects of changes in government spending depend on both the timing
and the patterns of spending. A transitory (balanced—budget) rise in current
government spending raises the current rate of interest and lowers domestic and
foreign wealth while a transitory future rise in government spending lowers the
current rate of interest, lowers domestic wealth and raises foreign wealth. A
permanent rise in government spending lowers the rate of interest if the current
account of' the balance of payments is in deficit, and vice versa. Finally, the
model is generalized to a multi—commodity world and the impact of policies are
shown to depend on comparison among various spending and saving propensities of
private sectors and of governments.
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(31 2)962—8253I. INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the international transmission of the effects
of fiscal expenditures and budget deficits. One of the major sources of
recent friction between Europeans and Americans has been the interpretation
of the economic implications of U.S. budget deficits. Theorists and
policymakers on both sides of' the Atlantic have differed in the analysis of
the role of budget deficits in affecting key macroeconomic aggregates.
Specifically, some have argued that large budget deficits are responsible
for the recently observed high real rates of interest while others have
claimed that budget deficits cannot be blamed for these real rates. The
latter group claimed that theory does not predict a clear'-cut relation
between budget deficits and rates of interest and that the empirical record
itself is very weak.
The increased integration of the world economy has resulted in
increased concern in each country over policy measures taken in the rest of
the world.A major topic of recent analysis concerns the impact of'
government spending and budget deficits on key macroeconomic aggregates.
The complex pattern of the economic linkages within the interdependent world
economy resulted in a variety of models of the international transmission
mechanisms [for surveys see Fair (1979) and Mussa (1979)]. These models
include those that highlight the implications of foreign trade multipliers
(e.g., LINK models which build on a Keynesian structure) as well as those
that highlight the role of the terms of trade along the lines of the
elasticity approach to the balance—of—payments. In addision, some analyses
have examined whether disturbances can be transmitted negatively to the rest
of the world. For example, Laursen and Metzler (1950) showed that in a
model without capital flows, domestic autonomous government expenditures
which raise domestic output, lower the level of ouput abroad; i.e. domestic
spendings are transmitted negatively to the rest of the world. Parallel to
these developments there were examinations of the transmission mechanism
along the lines of the Mundell—Fleming models [see Mundell (1968) and
Fleming (1962)], where it was shown that an expansionary monetary policy is
transmitted negatively to the rest of the world whereas fiscal policy is
transmitted positively. More recently modelling of exchange—rate dynamics
focused on the role of expectations and relied on the real rate of interest2
as a key factor in the transmission mechanism [see Dornbusch (1976) and
Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982)].
The question of the effects of budget deficits on rates of interest,
on consumption, arid on the nature of the real equilibrium, has been the
subject of analysis in both closed and open economy contexts. Much of the
traditional analysis demonstrating that budget deficits exert real effects
have built on the presumption that government bonds constitute net wealth to
individual asset—holders. The key issue of' debate has been whether asset—
holders take full account of the prospective tax liabilities that are
associated with the need to service the debt created by current deficits.
Recent research on the effects of fiscal policies has embodied the Ricardian
proposition according to which individuals take full account of' future tax
liabilities and, therefore, as long as government spending remains
unchanged, the path of taxes and thereby the path of budget deficits do not
affect the real equilibrium of the system. [For expositions see Bailey
(1962) and Barro (19714)].
As is well known there are several ways by which a "fully rational"
model can incorporate the feature that budget deficits influence the nature
of the real equilibrium. For example, models which allow for distortionary
taxes, [e.g. Barro (1979), Kydland and Prescott (1980), Lucas and Stokey
(1983), and Razin and Svensson (1983), price rigidities or incomplete
markets for intergenerational risk sharing [e.g. Stiglitz (1983)], capital
controls [e.g. Greenwood and Kimbrough (19814)], or individuals with finite
horizons, [e.g. Diamond (1965) and Samuelson (1958)], will all yield the
result that fiscal deficits matter.
In this paper we develop a model that is suitable for the analysis of
(1) the linkage between fiscal policies and rates of interest, and (ii) the
international transmission mechanism of fiscal policies. The key
characteristics of our model are:(i) a fully integrated world capital
market;(ii) full rationality of all economic agents whose decisions are
based on self—fulfilling expectations and are subjected to temporal and
intertemporal budget constraints, ana (iii) government behavior that is
constrained by an intertemporal solvency requirement. The model is of a
general equilibrium nature, and the various economies have access to, and
are governed by, world markets. These markets determine both temporal3
prices (commodity terms of trade) and intertemporal prices (rates of
interest).
In order to deal with tne role of' budget deficits in effecting world
rates of interest, consumption and international indebtedness, and to study
the resulting nature of the international transmission mechanism, our model
includes individuals with the possibility of finite horizons. We adopt the
formulation developed in Blanchard (19814) according to which the finiteness
of the horizon is introduced through the assumption that at each point in
time, individuals, who are assumed to have no bequest motive, face a given
probability of death. The uncertainty concerning the length of life results
in an equilibrium in which private and social rates of discount differ.
This difference between discount rates (which is responsible for the
departure from the Ricardian Proposition on the irrelevancy of budget
deficits), permits a meaninful analysis of the impact of budget deficits.
Section II presents the key features of the model and section III
characterizes the properties of equilibrium in the two--country world
economy. In section Iv we analyse the effects of a current budget deficit
that is brought about through a reduction in the home—country's taxes. It
is shown that a current budget deficit raises the rate of interest. In
addition, the budget deficit raises the value domestic wealth and l3wers the
value of foreign wealth. Thus, the deficit is transmitted negatively to the
rest of the world. Similar qualitative results apply to the analysis of the
effects of expected future budget deficits. As shown in section V, an
expected future deficit also raises domestic wealth and lowers foreign
wealth but its impact on the current period's rate of interest is ambiguous
as it depends on whether the country introducing the budgetary deficit runs
a surplus or a deficit in the current account of its balance of payments.
In section VI we apply the model to an analysis of' the steady—state
consequences of budget deficits.
In sections VII and VIII we turn to examine the impact of changes in
the level of government spending. In order to separate the analysis of the
level of fiscal spending from the analysis of budget deficits, we focus on
the implications of a balanced—budget change in government spending. It is
shown that a transitory rise in government spending raises interest rates
and lowers domestic and foreign wealth. On the other hand, an expected
future rise in government spending lowers interest rates and reduces thevalue of domestic wealth and consumption, while it raises the value of
foreign wealth and consumption. We then analyse the effect of a permanent
rise in government spending. It is shown that its impact on the rate of
interest depends on whether the domestic economy is a net saver or dissaver
in the world economy or, equivalently, whether it has a current account
surplus or deficit. If the home country runs a current account surplus then
a rise in government spending raises world interest rates and lowers
domestic and foreign wealth and consumption. On the other hand if the home
country runs a current account deficit then a permanent balanced—budget rise
in government spending lowers interest rates and domestic wealth and raises
foreign wealth. We thus, show the critical importance of specifying the
details of fiscal policy in terms of the level and timing of government
spending and taxes.
In sections IX and X we generalize the model to a multi—commodity
world. The extended model is then applied to examine the effects of
government spending on the intertemporal terms of trade (as measured by the
rates of interest) and on the temporal terms of trade (as measured by the
relative price of importables in terms of exportables). We show that the
impact of government spending as well as the dynamics of debt accumulation
depend on a comparison among (1) domestic and foreign patterns of private
sector spending, (ii) domestic and foreign private sectors' saving
propensities, and (iii) domestic and foreign patterns of government
spending. These comparisons generate a multitude of "transfer problem
criteria" that are familiar from the theory of transfers in international
trade [see Mussa (1969)]. Finally, section Xi contains concluding remarks
followed by six Appendices that provide technical material underlying some
of the statements made in the text.
II. The Model
The model has two economies consisting of consumers and governments.
The path of output in each economy is assumed given. Individuals are
assumed to face a given probability of death which is independent of age.
We denote the probability of survival between two consecutive periods by I
Because of uncertain lifetime all loans require in addition to regular
interest payments a purchase of life insurance as in Yarn (1965) and
Blarichard (198)4). In case of death, the estate is transfered to the life5
insurancecompany which, in turn, guarantees to cover outstanding debts. It
is assumed that there are a large number of individuals and, therefore,
competition among insurance companies implies that the percentage insurance
premium equals the probability of death. Tne present—value factor, which is
composed of one—period rates of interest compounded from period zero up to
period t ,ISdenoted by and, therefore, equals one plus the
market rate of interest in period t—1. Analogously, equals one
plus the life—insurance premium. It follows that the effective interest
rate faced by individuals is (Ith/yt)(a/a) -1.This is the effective
cost of borrowing relevant for individual decision making.
Under the assumptions that the utility function is logarithmic and
that the subjective discount factor, ,isconstant, it can be shown1 that
the aggregate consumption function (which is derived from individuals'
maximization of expected utility) is
(1) c (l—i)W,
where denotes aggregate wealth. Aggregate wealth in turn equals the
difference between human wealtn, H ,andprivate debt Bt .Thevalue of
human wealth is the discounted sum of disposable income,y ,whichis
computed by using the effective rates of interest.
Government spending can be financed by taxes or by debt issue. The
requirement that over time government spending must obey the intertemporal
solvency constraint can be expressed as
(2) (T —G)=
Bg0 v= 0
where T,G denote taxes and government spending in period v and where
Bg0 denotes the value of government debt at t=0. Equation (2) states that
thevalue of government debt must equal the sums of the present values of
current and future budget surpluses. The sum of Private debt ,and
governmentdebt, Bgequals the value of the economy's external debt, B
The behavioral equations for the foreign economy can be derived in a
similar way and, in what follows, we denote variables pertaining to the
foreign economy by an asterisk(*).6
III. World quilibrium
In this section we analyse the determination of the equilibrium path
of world rates of interest in the twocountry world economy. We will assume
that world capital markets are fully integrated and, therefore, that
indiviQuals and governments in both countries face the same market rates of
interest. This feature provides for the key channel through which policies
undertaken in one country impact on economic conditions in the rest of the
world. The structure of the model embodies the assumptions that the
behavior of individuals is rational, that it is based upon seif—fulifilling
expectations, and that governments and individuals are constrained by
initertemporal budget constraints. These assumptions imply that economic
policies have an impact on the entire path of interest rates and, thereby,
on the paths of the key economic variables relevant for current and future
generations in both countries.
World equilibrium requires that in each period the given supply of
world output equals the demand. To facilitate the exposition we start by
dividing the horizon into two periods: the present, which is denoted by
t=O , and the future (t=1 ,2,.. .), and we suppose that outputs, government
spending and taxes do not vary across future periods (t=1,2,...). This
procedure of time—aggregation is modified in section V below. In
aggregating the future into a composite single period we need to compute the




where r denotes the rate of interest. This average—interest factor
represents the entire path of the rates of interest that actually do change
over time. For further reference R may be termed a "constancy equivalent"
interest factor.
The equality between world demands and world output in period t=O
is written as
(3) (1-yo)W0 +(1_yo*)W*=(I-C)+(y*_G*)
where the left—hand side of equation (3) describes the sum of domestic and
foreign private sectors' consumption and the right—hand side describes the
sum of domestic and foreign outputs (I and Y) net of governments'7
spending.2 For expositional simplicity we have also assumed in equation (3)
that 1=1 .Twoadditional equilibrium conditions specify the initial




















In equations ()—(5) the term YR/(1—IR) denotes the present value
of an annuity evaluated by using the effective constancy equivalent interest
factor. Equation (5) embodies the requirement that the sum of the balance
of external indebtedness of both countries must be zero and, therefore, the
foreign country's external debt is —B .Itis noteworthy that by Walrast
Law we have excluded from the equilibrium conditions the equation stating
that the sum of the present values of world outputs net of government
spending in the future equals the corresponding sum of world demand.
The system of equations (3)—(5) can be solved for the values of W
* 0
and W and R for any given value of the parameters. The solutions 0 *
obtained for the initial values of wealth Wand 14 ,arethe same as
0 0
those which may be obtained from the complete system for which the values of
the rates of interest within the future may vary. The use of the
constancy—equivalent interest factor simplifies the analysis considerably,
and it provides complete information about the impact of policies on the
precise current values of all key variables including wealth, consumption,
and debt accumulation, as well as on the average value of the rate of
interest.
IV. The Impact of Budget Deficits
In this section we analyse the impacts of budget deficits on world
rates of interest and on the levels of domestic and foreign wealth and
consumption. The analysis of the effects of budget deficits on the levels
of foreign wealth and consumption serves to clarify the nature of the
international transmission mechanism of fiscal policies. In order to focus
on the impact of deficits rather than the impact of government spending, we
assume that changes in budget deficits are brought about through changes in8
taxes for a given path of government spending. Since government spending
remains unchanged, solvency requires that current changes in taxes be
accompanied by offsetting changes in future taxes. The present values of
these tax changes must be equal to each other. Thus, starting with an
initial balanced budget, a change in current taxes, dT0 ,mustbe related
to the future change, dT ,accordingto
(6) dT =—
Inequation (6) the term R/(1—R) equals 1/r, which is the annuity value
of' a unit tax change.
Throughout the analysis in this section we assume that the foreign
government follows a balanced—budget policy. This assumption ensures that
changes in world rates of interest which result from domestic fiscal
deficits, do not impact on the solvency of the foreign government and,
therefore, do not necessitate secondary changes in foreign fiscal policies.
Using equations (3)—(5) the impacts of changes in domestic taxes on
R , W ,andW (evaluated around an initial balanced budget) are:






[e(Y-G) +(y* G*)] <
dW0 (1-i) (1—16) **
cIT AR(1—R)(1—YR)
[e(Y—G) +w(Y G )]>0
where, as shown in Appendix II, A,e,andw are positive.
Equation (7) shows that a budget deficit arising from a reduction in
domestic taxes lowers R thus and raises the value of the world interest
rate. The economic interpretation of this result is as follows. From
equation ()wenote that, at the prevailing rate of interest, the fall in
current taxes (which is accompanied by a corresponding rise in future taxes9
according to equation (6)), raises the value of domestic wealth by (1—1)(1--
R)/R(1—yR) and, thereby, raises spending by the value of'themarginal
propensityto spend,i—yo,timesthe change in wealth. The resulting
excess demand for current goods raises their relative price in terms of
future goods, and thusraises the world interestrate. As shown in Appendix
II, (1/A) serves to translate excess demands for current goods into
equilibrating changes in the rate ofinterest.
Equations(8)—(9) show tnat the domestic buaget deficit raises the
equilibrium value of domestic wealth, W ,andlowers the corresponding
value of foreign wealth, W0 .Thus,domestic budget deficits are
transmitted negatively to the rest of the world. The international trans-
mission mechanism is effected through the rate of interest. The rise in the
world interest rate lowers the value of foreign wealth and mitigates the
initial rise in the value of domestic wealth. These changes in wealth raise
domestic spending, lower foreign spending and worsen the domestic current
account of the balance of payments.
As may be seen from equations (7)—(9), when the probability of
survival, 'i', isunity budget deficits do not alter interest rates arid
wealth. In that case the model yields the familiar Ricardian Proposition
according to which the timing of taxes and thereby the timing of deficits do
not influence the real equilibrium of the system as long as the path of
government spending remains intact. In the general case, however, with
1<1 ,budgetdeficits exert real effects.
The explanation for these results can be given as follows. If the
probability of survival, 'y,isunity, then the rise in future taxes which
is equal in present value to the redction in current taxes leaves wealth
unchanged. On the other hand, the same change in the pattern of taxes
raises wealth if' each individual knows that there is a positive probability
that he will not survive to pay these higher future taxes. Under such
circumstances, therefore, the current reduction in taxes constitutes net
wealth. Equivalently, the explanation can be stated in terms of the
difference between the market ana the effective interest factors. While the
government solvency requirement implies that changes in current taxes must
be made up for by R/(1—R) times the offsetting change in future taxes,
individuals discount these future taxes by YR/(1—IR). Therefore, as long10
as 1<1 ,thecurrent budget deficit raises wealth. Yet another interpreta-
tion may be given in terms of a "transfer problem criterion" familiar from
the theory of international transfers. Accordingly, the budget deficit
exerts real effects because it redistributes wealth from those who have not
yet been born,and whose marginal propensity to consume current goods is
obviously zero, to those who are currently alive, and whose marginal
propensity to consume current goods is positive. The clear presumption
concerning the results of this redistribution is analogous to the presump-
tion concerning the effects of an international transfer on relative prices
in the presence of non—traded goods.
V. The Impact of Future Budget Deficits
The previous analysis of the impact of budget deficits was conducted
within a framework which consolidated the entire future into a single
period. Consequently, in order to ensure solvency, a current budget deficit
had to imply a corresponding rise in future taxes. This procedure of time—
aggregation did not permit an analysis of the impact of future budget
deficits which are not accompanied by current changes in taxes. In order to
examine the effects of future deficits we modify in this section the
aggregation of the periods. Specifically, we divide the future into two
parts ——thenear future and the distant future. As before, the distant
future is represented by a consolidation of the entire period subsequent to
that of the near future into a single period. In what follows a subscript
0 designates variables pertaining to the present period, a subscript 1
designates variables pertaining to the near future an, finally, variables
which appear without a time subscript pertain to the distant future.
Consider an expected change in taxes occurring in the near future.
Without changes in present taxes government solvency requires that such a
change must be accompanied by. further offsetting changes in the distant
future. Thus, solvency requires that
(6') dT1 =- dT
where is constancy—equivalent interest factor in the distant future;
i.e., it is the average one—period interest factor linking the near future11
with the distant future. In order to compute the effects of such future
policies we note that the equilibrium system consists of the following
requirements:(1) world output in the present period must be demanded
(analogously to equation (3)),(ii) world output in the near future must
be demanded, (iii) the equilibrium values of domestic and foreign wealth
consist of the sums of the present values of disposable incomes in the
present, the near future and the distant future, adjusted for the initial
debt (analogously to equations (4)—(5)). This equilibrium system is
described in Appendix III.
The impacts of the near—future budget deficit on domestic and foreign
wealth are:
dU (Y1—G1 +Y1—G1)













As seen, analogously to the analysis of the effects of current budget
deficits, future deficits (that are brought about through a reduction in
taxes) also raise the equilibrium value of domestic wealth, W ,andlower
the corresponding value of foreign wealth W0. Thus, domestic future budget
deficits are also transmitted negatively to the rest of' the world. As
before, these changes in wealth do not occur when 1=1.
The impact of the future budget deficit on the current and future
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(13)
1 1** >0






Equation (12) shows that the effect of a future budget deficit on the
current one—period rate of interest depends on the relation between the
domestic and the foreign saving propensities and, therefore,one may not
argue that a future budget deficit per se raises short term interest rates.
* If6 < 6the future budget deficit lowers R and raises the current
0*
one—periodrate of interest and conversely if 6 > 6 .Equation(13) shows
that a future budget deficit raises the future rate of interest.
The interpretation of these results is as follows. The future budget
deficit creates an excess demand for goods in the near future (i.e., in the
period in which the deficit occurs). In order to eliminate this excess
demand the future rate of interest must rise according to equation (13). In
interpreting the impact of the future deficit on the current short—term
interest rate, we note that in the present period no government action takes
place and, therefore, the change in the current rate of interest results
only from changes in world savings Which, in turn, stem from changes in
domestic and foreign wealth. At the prevailing short term Interest rate
foreign wealth falls because of the rise in the future rate of interest
while the rise in domestic wealth consequent on the future budget deficit Is
mitigated by the rise in the future rate of interest. These changes in
wealth lower the foreign demand for current goods and raise the domestic
demand for these goods. World demand for current goods rises or falls
depending on the difference between the two spending propensities. There-
fore, in order to restore world equilibrium with zero savings the current
* *
one—periodinterest rate must fall if6 > 6and must rise if 6 < 6
Again, when 1=1 the future deficit does not alter the rate of Interest.
Our analysis of the effects of budget deficits on the values of
domestic and foreign wealth has demonstrated that the international trans-
mission of the deficit must always be negative independent of whether the13
budget deficit occurs in the present or in the future. On the other hand we
have shown that the impact of a future budget deficit on the current short—
term rate of interest depends on whether the country which introduces the
budgetary changes runs a surplus ordeficit in its international current
account, I.e., if its saving propeisity exceeds or falls short of the
foreign saiing propensity. Since it was shown in equations (1O)-'(ll) that
the directions of the changes in wealth do not depend on the direction of
the changes in the current short—term rates of interest and since the link
between foreign wealth and domestic budget deftoits operates only through
world capital markets, it follows that a f'ure deficit must raise the
overall "appropriate average" of short and long term rates of interest. In
*
thespecial case with a future budget deficit does not alter the
short term interest rate and is reflected only in higher long—term rates; it
thus steepens the yield curve. Again, the Ricardian Proposition reemerges
and these changes vanish when I =1
VI. Long—Run Equilibrium
In this section we analyse the long run effects of budget deficits on
the steady_state levels of domestic and foreign wealth and on world rates of
interest.
The steady—state value of domestic wealth is3
(1) W =(1I)(1(
Analogously, the steady—state value of foreign wealtn is:
** * *R(Y—T)
(15) W =(i—v —-- -
(1—yR)(R—15)
1orldequilibrium requires that the sum of domestic anu foreign consumption
equals the level of world output net of governments' spending. Using the
steady—state value of wealth in the consumption function (1) along with the
analogous expressions for tne foreign country yields equation (16) as the
condition for world equilibrium:** *
(16) (116)(11)(YT)R +(11**)(1Y
)(Y —T )R—Q+ (1-RyJ (1_Y*R)(R_1*o*)
—
* **
where QY—G and Q =Y=Gdenote the levels of domestic and foreign
outputs net of government absorption. Equilibrium also requires that both
governments be solvent, and thus that in each country the value of







Forgiven values of guernment debt, Band B (which reflect past
g g *
budgetdeficits) and for given values of government spending, C and G
the system (i6)—(18) can be used to obtain the solutions for the equilibrium
steady—state values of world interest factor, R ,andof domestic and
*
foreigntaxes, T and T .Positivesteady—state consumption in both
countries requires that the equilibrium value of R must be larger than Y6
**
andI ó .Forexogenously given values of the parameters the existence of
such a steady—state is not guaranteed. If this steady—state does not exist,
**
thenwhen 15 > I ó the wealth of the foreign country approaches zero
while the home country saves until it owns the entire wealth of the world,
*
andvice versa. Finally, it is relevant to note that when 1=1 =1 steady—
state equilibrium with positive levels of consumption in both countries
*
requiresthat ó=ó .Inthat case the equilibrium value of R equals the
common value of the discount factors.
We now examine the effects of past cumulative budget deficits on the
long run values of the rate of interest and wealth. A higher cumulative
value of past budget deficits in the home country is reflected in a higher
steady—state value of government debt, B. By differentiating equations
(16)—(i8) it is shown in Appendix III that
(19) < 015
Thus, a rise in tne steady—state value of domestic government debt raises
the steady—state rate of interest (i.e., it lowers the interest factor). It
follows therefore that past (cumulative) budget deficits also tend to raise
world rates of interest.
The effect of a rise in the steady—state value of domestic government
debt on the steady—state value of foreign wealth is specified in equation
(20):
*
dW * 2 *
(20) sign =sign[6(1—IR) —R(R—Yo )J
g
Thus the direction of the transmission of past domestic budget deficits on
the steady—state value of foreign wealth may be positive or negative
depending on the relative magnitudes of the parameters. Specifically, if R
* * * fallsshort of 6 (but still exceeds 1 6so that the steady state
exists), higher cumulative domestic budget deficits raise the steady—state
value of foreign wealth. In view of equation (20) it is of interest to note
that even though current and future budget deficits must lower the current
value of foreign wealth (as shown in sections IV and v), the long run
effects of the cumulative past deficits on the (steady—state) value of
foreign wealth are still ambiguous. Finally, we also show in Appendix III
that the effect of a higher value ofBg on the domestic value of steady—
state wealth contains, in addition to the interest—rate effect discussed
above, also a direct negative effect associated with the rise in steady—
state taxes necessary to service the debt.5
VII. Government Spending, Interest rates and Transmission
The previous sections analysed the effects of budget deficits on the
equilibrium of the system. In that analysis changes in the deficit were
brought about through changes in taxes while holding government spending
intact. In the present section we analyse the effects of cnanges in the
level of government spending. In order to focus on the level of fiscal
spending rather than on the consequent changes in deficits, we suppose that
all changes in government spending are accompanied by corresponding changes
in taxes so as to yield balanced budgets. In what follows we return to the
time—aggregate of sections III and IV where we divided the periods into two16
the present and the consolidated future. We also distinguish between
transitory and permanent changes. Transitory changes alter only current
spending by dGwhereas permanent changes also alter future spending by
dG
Using equations (3)—(5) with the aid of Appendix Ii, the impact of a




Equation (21 )showsthat a transitory rise in government spending
lowers R and, therefore, raises the interest rate. This change in the
interest rate is necessary in order to eliminate the excess demand for
current goods consequent on the rise in government spending. This balanced—
budget rise in government spending results in and excess demand for current
goods because the rise in taxes lowers wealth by an amount equal to the rise
in government spending and, since the private sector's marginal spending
propensity is smaller than unity, private expenditure is reduced by only a
fraction of the rise in government spending.
The rise in the rate of interest lowers both domestic and foreign
wealth and, thereby, results in a reduction of domestic and foreign
consumption. Thus the current transitory balanced—budget rise in domestic
fiscal spending is paid for in part by the foreign country.
The same argument applies to the analysis of the effect of an
expected future change in government spending. Formally, using equations
(3)—(5) we obtain
dR ''(1—R)(1--i6) (2) =
(1—Th)
>
As seen in equation (22) a ruture balanced—budget rise in government
spending raises H (namely, it lowers the rate of interest). The fall in
the rate of interest is necessary since, at the prevailing rate of interest,
the expected rise in future taxes lowers wealth and reduces consumption
demand and, thereby, results in an excess supply of current output. This17
excess supply is eliminated by the fall in the rate of interest which raises
foreign wealth and which mitigates the initial fall in domestic wealth.
The results in equations (21)—(22) provide the ingredients necessary
for the analysis of the effects of a permanent balanced—budget rise in
government spending. In that case dG dG =dG ,andthe impact of this
fiscal expansion on the rate of interest can be obtained by adding the
expressions in equations (21)—(22). It follows, therefore, that
(23) = (R—6)
Thus, the effects of a permanent rise in government spending on the rate of
interest depends on whether the interest factor, R ,exceedsor falls short
of the discount factor, S .Theinterpretation of tnis result can be given
in terms of the effect of fiscal spending on the excess demand for current
goods or, equivalently, in terms of its effect on world savings. As a
result of the permanent rise in fiscal spending, at the prevailing interest
rate, both the supply of output net of government absorption, as well as the
demand for consumption, are reduced by the same proportion. Therefore, the
excess supply of current goods or, alternatively, the level of savings, also
changes by the same proportion. If tne initial level of domestic savings
was negative, tnen the rise in fiscal spending raises the value of savings
(by making it less negative) and,thereby, induces a fall in the relative
price of present goods, that is, a fall in brie rate of interest. On the
other hand, if the initial value of' domestic savings was positive, the
permanent rise in governraerft spending lowers domestic savings and results in
a higher rate of interest. Tnese results are analogous to those obtained
for the effect of a future budget deficit on the current one—period rate of
interest. The link between this explanation and the expression in equation
(23) is completed by noting that ifR > 5 the initial value of the home
country's savings is negative and the economy runs a current account
deficit, whereas the opposite holds if R < 6
Tne change in the rate of interest alters the values of domestic and
foreign wealth aru consumption. If tne rate of interest rises, then foreign
wealth falls and if the rate of interest falls foreign wealth rises. As is
obvious, the permanent rise in domestic fiscal spending lowers domestic18
wealth; the fall in wealtY occurring at the initial rate of interest is
reinforced or mitigatea depending on whether the equilibrium rate of
interestrises or falls.
VIII. Government Spending and Interest Rats:AFurther Elaboration
The previous analysis employed the constancy—equivalent interest
factor in order to collapse the entire future into a single period. This
procedure permitted a complete specification of the impact of policies on
the current values of the key variables. However, it did not permit a
detailed examination of the impact of policies on the paths of the various
variables within the consolidated future. Since the central channel of the
transmission mechanism operates through the rates of interest, it is in-
structive to analyse in further detail the impact of government spending on
the entire path of these rates. For that purpose we need to return to the
complete disaggregated system. Since the qualitative results in equations
(21 )—(23) of the impact of government spending do not depend on whether I
*
issmaller than or equal to unity, we assume henceforth that I 1 1
The complete system is described in Appendix IV, where the precise solution
for the entire path of the present value factors, a ,isgiven in equation
(Iv—6). We turn to an analysis of the role of the timing of government
spending on the path of the rates of interest and we distinguish between
transitory and permanent changes in fiscal spending.6 Suppose that a
transitory change is expected to occur in period s the future. The impact
of a future transitory change in government spending on the path of the
present—value factors is obtained by differenting equation (IV—6) with
respect to Qfor t =s 0and for ts 0 .Thesechanges in the
present—value factors can be translated into corresponding changes in rates
of interest by recalling that =[(i+r0)(1+r1)...(1+r)]
1
Specifi-
cally, when the paths of outputs are stationarythe effect of a transitory
reductionin future government spending on the rates of interest prevailing
in the adjacent period s —1,i.e., on r5_1(where r5_1=(a51/a5 —1))is
*
dr (1—6)a a ** *
s—i s—i s s—i*3—1 1—6 6 *6
(214) [)(5 —6)+ d a3_1 1-6 1-6
1—619
An analogous expression pertains to dr/dQ3.7 The effect of the transitory
future reduction in government spending on interest rates prevailing in all
other periods t—1(excluding t=1, t=s, t=s÷1) depends on the relation
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Theresults reported in equations (2L)—(25) specify the effects of
future changes in government spending on the various rates of interest.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of a transitory future reduction in
government spending occurring in period s=4 on the pattern of current and
* futureshort (one—period) interest rates for the case > ó .Inthat
*
figurethe solid curve (for which A =A=0.5)describes the initial
pattern of interest rates, and the dashed curve describes the pattern
corresponding to a situation with an expected future transitory fall in
fiscal spending. As is seen, the expected transitory reduction in future
government spending tilts the entire term structure of interest rates.
We turn now to examine the effect of a permanent fall in domestic
fiscal spending (i.e., a permanent rise in net output) on the rates of
interest. This effect is best illustrated for the case in which outputs are
stationary. Differentiating equation (IV—6) yields:
dr1 A t(16)(1 **
(26) dQ 2 —
Interms of Figure 1 ,thesolid schedules illustrate the effect of a
permanent change in government spending (as parameterizea by the values of
* * *
Aand A )forthe case in which .Asseen, with 6 > 6 ,a
permant fall in domestic government spending (i.e. a rise in Aand a fall
* inA ),lowersthe entire structure of interest rates. This qualitative
* resultis reversed if 6 < 6
The interpretation of this result can be given in terms of the effect
of' the change in government spending on world savings at the prevailing
rates of interest. The rise in net domestic output changes current domestic20
savings by [dQ —(1—o)dW].In the stationary case, with the prevailing
rates of interest, the percentage change in o.xnestic output, dQ0/Q0 i
equalsthe percentage change in domestic wealth dW/W .Inthat case the
incipient change in domestic savings is p[Q (i—o)W0J, where the term in
the brackets measures the initial value of domestic savings. Clearly, at
the prevailing rates of interest, foreign savings do not change. As is
evident, the initial value of domestic savings is positive if the domestic
*
marginalpropensity to save exceeds the foreign propensity, i.e., if 6 > 6
(in that case equilibrium requires that initially foreign savings were
*
negative).Conversely, if 6 < a ,domesticsavings were negative. Thus,
the permanent fall in domestic fiscal spending (the rise in Q), raises world
*
savingsand induces a fall in the rates of interest if 6 > 6 ,andvice
versa.
IX. The Model With Variable Terms of Trade
The analysis in the previous sections was confined to a world with a
single composite commodity. In that world the only relevant relative price
was that of consumption in different periods, i.e., the rate of interest.
In this section we extend the model to allow for two different commodities.
Therefore, in addition to the intertemporal terms of trade, the extended
model also incorporates the role of the more conventional terms of trade,
i.e., the relative price of importables in terms of exportables. The two
good world contains additional channels of interdependence that were not
present in the one—good world. Since the relative prices of goods reflect
the pattern of spending in both countries, the analysis of fiscal policies
needs to specify the spending patterns of the government. In general it
will be seen that the impact of policies depends on relations between
various behavioral propensities. Specifically, the key factors determining
the outcomes of policies are differences among the spending patterns and the
saving propensities of four groups: foreign and domestic private sectors as
well as foreign and domestic governments. These differences govern the
evolution of relative prices and rates of interest following fiscal changes.
In order to highlight the key economic factors that affect the equilibrium
we abstract in this section from issues concerning the timing of government
spending. We thus assume that all changes are permanent and that the paths21
of outputs (net of government spending) are stationary. We also continue to
*
assumethat Y =I=1
Let the home country exportable good be denoted byx and its
importable good by m.To simplify the analysis assume that each country
is completely specialized in production. Thus, good x is only produced in
the home country at the level X and good m is only produced in the
foreign country at the level M.Consumers on the other hand are assumed
to consume both goods but, since tastes may differ across countries, con-
sumption patterns may differ. More formally, the expanded menu of goods is
now incorporated into the utility function by noting that c is a com-
posite good which is defined as a Cobb—Douglas function of its components,
i.e., log c =log c +(1—s)log c - Privatespending is
z =c
+PtCmtmeasured in units of good x .Governmentspending
also falls on both goods; denotes government spending on x and Cm
denotes government spending on m .Intertemporalutility maximization
yields the spending function z (1—a)Wt.The temporal utility maxirniza—
tion yields the demand functions ext = and 0mt =(1)
.ItIS
relevant to emphasize tnat5 measures the marginal propensity to save out
of wealth whereas measures the marginal propensity to consume good x
out of spending. The foreign country is modelled in an analogous fashion.
In order to facilitate the analysis of comparative statics we define
henceforth x as domestic product net of the home country's government
spending on domestic product, and m as the foreign product net of the
foreign country's government spending on its product. Thus, x =X—G
* x
and m=M-Gm
The equilibrium conditions are outlined in Appendix V. In addition
to the previous requirements, equilibrium now also requires that the world
market for each good clear. The solution of the system for the equilibrium
values of W, Wand p0 is given in equations (27)-(29):
* * *
* (x—G)[—(xm—G C )+m(x—G)+(1—)(rn—G )B] x mx x m
vlo= ** * * * *
(x—G)[(1—a)m_(l6)Gm]
+ (DXxGm.6—6)22
** * * **
(x—G)[(xm—GG )Gm(XG
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Theexplicit solution for P0 can be obtained by substituting (27) for
into (29).10
The equilibrium solutions of the present—value factors, in terms of
goods x nc1mare given by equations (30)—(31):
* *tt
(30) p +(1—6)[(1—)x +(1—6)B](o —
t x[1-(1-B)6 -
* t ** *t * **t,* t
(1—)x[ (1—6)6 +(1— )(1—ó )o]+(1—6)(1—6)[(1— )(— (1—)6)]B (31) tt = * *
m[1 —(1—)6
X. Government Spending, The Terms of Trade, Interest Rates and Transmission
In this section we analyze the effects of fiscal spending on domestic
and foreign real wealth and on the rates of interest. In general it will be
seenthat the key factors determining the outcomes of government spending
are differences among the spending patterns and the saving propensities of
fourgroups: foreign and domestic private sectors as well asforeign and
domestic governments. These differences govern the evolution of relative
pricesand rates of interest following fiscal changes.
Since real consumption levels are proportional to real wealth, we
examine the nature of the transmission mechanism by focusing on the impact
of fiscal spending on real consumption levels. Recalling that the values of
real consumption at home and abroad are
* * * *
= (1—6)Wt/ptand c =(1—6)WtIp itcan be shown from equations (27)—(29) that the logarithmic derivatives of
realconsumption with respect to changes in government spending on domestic
goods,G
,andon foreign goods, G ,evaluatedaround an Initial
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As may be seen, a rise in fiscal spending on domestic goods lowers
the values of real consumption at home and abroad. The reduction in foreign
consumption thus "finances" part of the increased government spending. The
extent of the reduction in the values of real consumption of the private
* sectorsin both countries is proportional to Band B ——theimportance of
that good in private sectors' budgets. The precise effects of a rise in
government spending on foreign goods depends on the magnitudes of the
various propensities as may be seen from equations (33) and (35).
In order to highlight tne role of the government's spending propen-
sities we define the government spending function G as:
(36) GG +pG x m
and we assume that the government spending propensities are on good x,
and (lBG) on good m .Thus,G =
BGGand PGm =(lBG)G
,whicri2'4
impliesthat, formally G becomes a function of G ; G =G(G ).It
in x m in x
follows that around an initial equilibrium with zero government spending:
(3'j) dG-dG
mpx
where =(1G)/G.Using this specification of' government spending we
note that
* * * dlogclogc alogc 0 0 0
(38) =_________ +
dG BC pdG x m
To obtain insights into the economic factors which are at play, we
now turn to examine some special cases. These cases correspond to specific
assumptionsconcerning the marginal propensities. Assume first that the
*
domesticand foreign marginal saving propensities are the same, i.e., 5=6
Using equations (32)—(33) and the specification of government spending which
is embodied in (38) along with the solution forp0 we obtain:
dlogc0 (* * *
= [(8Q) +2(1—s)(1G)(8 )]
*
Thus,when =S the effect of domestic fiscal spending on foreign real
consumption depends on differences among the patterns of spending of
domestic private and public sectors, ,aswell as between domestic and
* C
foreign private sectors, .Theeconomic interpretation of this result
* isas follows. When 6=we know from equation (30) that in both
countries the interest rate equals the subjective discount rate. Therefore,
in each country savings are zero. In that case, neither the rates of'
interest, nor the total level of world spending are altered in response to
government spending since the government, like the private sectors, is a
zero saver. It follows that the potential effects of fiscal policies can
only operate through changes in relative prices. In conformity with the
standard analysis of economic transfers, such changes can occur only if the
spending patterns differ among private and public sectors.
To demonstrate the role of the spending patterns consider the
following special cases:25
(1) When all spending patterns are identical, i.e., when
we note from equation (39) that d log c0/dG =0 .Thus,in this case only
the domestic private sector is crowded out and the effects of fiscal policy
are not transmitted internationally. In that case aggregate behavior in the
various markets is not affected by the fiscal policy and, therefore, there
are no changes in relative prices.
(ii) When only the spending patterns of the domestic and foreign
* privatesector are identical, i.e., when , wenote from equation (30)
that the direction of the change in foreign real consumption following a
rise in domestic fiscal spending depends only on the difference between
and •If > ,arise in government spending creates an excess
supply of good x and an excess demand for good m at the initial relative
price. Equilibrium is restored through a rise in p ,therelative price of
good m. This rise inp raises the real value of foreign wealth and,
thereby, raises real consumption. In the extreme case for which =
i.e.,when government spending falls entirely on good x,foreignreal
consumption must fall (as was already shown in equation (32)). At the other
extreme, when =0 ,i.e.,when government spending falls entirely on
good m, (the case which corresponds to equation (33)), the value of foreign
real consumption must rise.
The effect of the rise in government spending on the home country's
real consumption must always be negative independent of the patterns of
government spending.. Thus, in conformity with the traditional results of
economic transfers, the secondary gain that might occur through an
improvement of the terms of trade cannot offset the primary loss which, in
the present case, is the tax levied to finance government spending.
*
Thepreceding analysis was confined to the case in which 5=5 so
that each country's income equaled its spending. In that case the interna-
tional transmission of government spending operated entirely through changes
in the relative price of goods without any impact on the rates of interest.
We turn now to examine the case in which the saving propensities differ,
* i.e.,5 5 .Inorder to isolate the effects of differences between
*
privateand public spending patterns we will assume that = .Analo-
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and vice versa. Tnus, the sign in (39' ) depends on the relation between the
spending patterns of the private sectors and the government, as well as on
the relationship between the saving propensities. In the special case for




In that case, with ,thepatternsof world spending on goods are
independent of fiscal policies, and the two goods can be aggregated into a
composite commodity as in Section VII. In that case the key factor
determining the effect of fiscal spending on foreign wealth and, thereby,
*
realconsumption is the relation between 5and 6 .Analogouslyto the
analysis of the one commodity world, the interpretation of this result is in
terms of the effect of government spending on the rate of interest. If
*
6> S ,theforeign country saves part of its income whereas the domestic
economy dissaves; thus the domestic country's marginal propensity to save
out of income is negative. In that case, a rise in the home country's
government spending amounts to transferring income from a dissaver (the home
country's private sector) to a zero saver (the government) and, thereby,
creating (at the prevailing rates of interest) excess world savings. To
restore equilibrium the rates of interest must fail. The fall in the rates
of interest raises foreign wealth and real consumption. The opposite occurs
*
whena<6 .Theeffect of government spending on the home country's real
consumption is always negative and the analysis is analogous to that of the
one—commodity world. As usual, the secondary gain arising from a fall in
*
therate of interest (that occurs when >5) cannot outweigh the primary
loss from the tax that is levied to finance government spending.
One ofthecentral mechanisms governing the international transmis-
sion mechanism operates through the real rates of interest. In what follows
we elaborate on the effects of government spending on the real rates of
interest. The example underlying equation (39'') assumes that the patterns
of spending are identical among domestic and foreign governments and private27
* sectors. Theequality between and Bimplies that the real rates of
interest are equal across countries. The additional assumption that
implies that the effects of changes in fiscal spending on the real rates of
interest depend only on the differences between the domestic and the foreign
saving propensities. The example underlying equation (39'),assumesthat
*= . Inthat case real rates of interest are equal across the world
but the Impact of government spending on the real rates of interest depends
not only on the relation between the two countries saving propensities, but
also on the relation between B and .Inthe general case for which
all spending patterns differ, real rates of interest differ across countries
and the effect of government spending on these rates is more complex.
To illustrate, consider the special case in which government spending
falls entirely on the domestically produced good, i.e.,BG =1.The
effects of government spending on the real rates of interest can be computed
from the effects of government spending on the present—value factors mea-
sured In terms of the consumption baskets. The domestic and foreign real






d log (atpB) *
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Thus, a reduction in government spending G(i.e., a rise in x) lowers
the real present—value factors in both countries and raises the correspond-
ing real rates of interest. In contrast with the case of equality among
private and public spending patterns (in which the direction of changes in
real rates of interest depended on the relation between saving propensi—
tIe8), here these propensities play no role. In the present case with
=1,domestic and foreign real rates of interest move in the same
direction. The extent of their response to government spending depends on28
the relative share of the good which is not consumed by the government (good
m) in private sectors' spending.
In the intermediate case for which government spending falls on both
goods but the relative share exceeds the corresponding shares of the
* G
private sectors, and ,theeffect of government spending on the real
rates of interest reflects the influence of both spending patterns and
*
savingspropensities. For example, if 6> 6a reduction in government
spending lowers world savings (as demonstrated for the one—commodity world)
and necessitates a higher rate of interest; this reinforces the effects
*
embodiedin equations (4O)—(4O' ).Onthe other hand, if6 > 6 ,the
reduction in government spending raises world savings. Its impact on the
real rates of interest tends to mitigate and may even reverse the effects
operating via equations ('4O)(4O').
XI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analysed the effects of budget deficits and
government spending, on world interest rates, and wealth. We examined in
detail the nature of the international transmission mechanism. The model
that was used embodied the assumptions that world capital markets are fully
integrated and that individuals behave rationally on the basis of self—
fulfilling expectations. Economic behavior of individuals and governments
was assumed to be governed by temporal and intertemporal budget constraints.
In order to capture the effects of budget deficits on world equilibrium, we
assumed that the probability of survival is less than unity and, therefore,
individuals behave as if their horizons was finite. The formulation assured
that the model was not subject to the Ricardian proposition according to
which budget deficits do not matter. Our analysis demonstrated that the
dependence of world rates of interest, wealth, and consumption, on fiscal
policies is highly sensitive to the detailed specification of the policies
in terms of the level and the time path of government spending and taxes.
The departure from the Ricardian proposition in this paper stems from
the difference between the effective interest—factor that indiviudals use in
discounting future taxes and the corresponding market interest—factor that
governs governments' behavior. In the present analysis the specific reason
responsible for the difference between the two interest factors was that
individuals were assumed to be mortal while governments were implicitely29
assumed to be immortal. In general, of course, the probability that
governments and their committments survive indefinitely is also less than
unity. Under such circumstances the impact of budget deficits is governed
by the relation between the survival probabilities of individuals and
governments. It is relevant to note that while the formulation in this
paper has focused on the survival probability as the reason for the
departure from the Ricardian proposition, the key argument need not hinge on
this specific formulation. In general, independent of the reasons for the
differences between effective and market interest factors, such differences
imply that, within the present framework, budget deficits exert real effects
on the world economy.
The examination of the effects of government spending showed that the
impact of fiscal expenditures can be analysed by reference to a multitude of
"transfer problem criteria," which are familiar from the theory of
international economic tranfers. In the present case the impact of policies
depended on relations among the spending propensities of domestic and
foreign private sectors and governments as well as on the difference between
domestic and foreign saving propensities. Our analysis drew a distinction
between permanent and transitory policies as well as between current
policies and expected future policies.
The analysis of the impact of government spending on real rates of
interest revealed that even when capital markets are highly integrated, real
rates of interest may differ if spending patterns differ across countries.
With such differences in spending patterns, fiscal policies exert different
quantitative effects on real rates of interest in the various countries. An
implication of this analysis is that in the presence of non—traded goods,
fiscal policies may also exert different qualitative effects on real rates
of interest in different countries since, depending on the nature of the
transmission mechanism and on the patterns of government and private
sectors' spending, the relative prices on non—traded goods, and thereby the
price indices, might be negatively correlated between countries [see
Dornbusch (1983)].
Our analysis is subject to several limitations which stem from some
of the simplifying assumptions. we assumed that the output levels were
given exogenously. An extension would allow for a process of Investment
which responds to rates of interest and which changes the paths of outputs30
[see,for example, Buiter (19611)]. Such an extension would modify the
pattern of the current account and debt accumulation [see, for example,
Sachs (1981 )].Theendogeneity of output could also be introduced through
the incorporation of some Keynesian features such as price rigidities.
Under such circumstances government spending would alter the level of
economic activity and would be transmitted internationally through
mechanisms similar to those of the foreign—trade multipliers.
An additional extension would modify the utility function so as to
generate a saving function possessing life—cycle characteristics. Specifi-
cally, the possibility that savings respond negatively to the rate of
interest would influence the impact of budget deficits on interest rates.
Throughoutthe analysis in this paper we assumed that the foreign
government followed a balanced—budget policy. TniS assumption was adopted
inorder to ensure that changes in world rates of interest which result from
domestic fiscal policies do not impact on the solvency of the foreign
government. If the foreign government does not follow a balanced—budget
policy, then interest—rate changes would necessitate secondary changes in
foreign spending or taxes in order to restore solvency. An extension of the
analysis would relax the foreign balanced—budget assumption and would allow
for the necessary adjustment of foreign fiscal management. A more major
extension would recognize that the interdependencies among the various open
economies provide incentives for strategic behavior by individual
countries.With such iricentivies, countries would attempt to exploit monopoly
power in goods and capital markets and to extract maximum seigniorage from
debt issue [see, for example, Hamada (19811)]. The analysis would then
determine the optimal pattern of government spending along with the optimal
trade—cum—capital—flows tax structure :s implied by the optimal tariff
literature. Such a strategic behavior could then be incorporated into a
more elaborate game—theoretic framework. Further, the interdependencies and
the strategic behavior could result in inefficient outcomes from a global
perspective that may call for harmonization of fiscal policies. In such an
extended framework, government spending and the timing of taxes would become
endogenous variables that are determined in the context of world
equilibrium.I. The Formal Model
Let the utility function at period t of an indivicual who was born
in period s be:
v= t






where b5t denotes the value of debt at the beginning of period t(which
was carried over from the end of period t—1), and denotes disposable
income which is assumed to be the same across all individuals regardless of
age. The solvency requirement is
(I—4) limytab =0 t St








where 6 denotes the subjective
rate of consumption in period V
probability, as of period t,
v (and enjoy the utility level
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where C denotes planned consumption for period v of an individual born
in period s and who makes his plan in period t.
Population is normalized so that every cohort born in period S
startswith one individual. Due to death, its size in period t becomes
i-—sTheequality between the probability of survival of a given cohort
and its frequency relative to its initial size stems from the law of large
numbers. Since t each period t there are 1ts members of each cohort,
the (constant) aggregate size of population Is:
1t-s =
1
and, therefore, aggregate disposable income is T
Aggregateconsumption in period t is the sumof consumption of indi-





Usingthe individual consumption function (1.6) (for v=t) and the definition
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Lagging equation (I—9a) by one period yields an analogous expression for
Ht_i which, together with equation (I—9a), yields:
It_la—
(1-10) Ht = t 1
(Ht_1 - I
The evolution of' aggregate private debt, Bt ,canbe obtained by
substituting equation (1—3) into the definition of debt in equation (I—9b)





Usingthe aggregate consumption function from equation (1—8),
together with the law of motion of human wealth from equation, (1—10) and
iterating yields:
(1-12) Bt =(1)t
[(B H) -(1-i)E (Io)V aH] +Ht
where H is cefined by equation (I—9a) and where B0 is the initially
given level of debt. Tne path of total wealth can be obtainec by sub—
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where 1, C denote taxes and government spending in period v and where
Bgt denotes the value of goiernment debt at the beginningof period t
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Thesum of' private debt, B ,andgovernment debt Bg equals the
value of the economy's external debt, B Thus, by adding equations (1—11)








where = + T_is gross domestic product.
World equilibrium requires that in each period the given supply of
world output equal world demana. Equilibrium in period t=O requires that
world private spending equal world output net of world governments' spend—
1 ng:
** * * — *
(1—17) (1—is)(H +B —B) +(1—v5 )(H + B +B) =I—G—G
o go o o go 0 00
Inequation (1—17) the left hand side describes the sum of domesticand
foreignconsumption where domestic consumption reflects equation (1—8) and
where foreign variables are indicated by an asterisk (*); Y denotes world
output, and we have substituted B0 for —B0
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The next set of conditions states that the values of human wealth in
each period must equal the sum of the present values of disposable incomes.






(1—20) H0 = y —T) v=0
and for all other period(t > 0):
(1-21)
11V v -T) I v=t
* 1 *v * *
(1—22) cztHt = I (Y —T) Iv=t
Thesystem is closed by the requirements that both governments be
intertemporally solvent. Using equation (1.114) and its foreign—country
analogue, we obtain:
(1—23) (T —G)= B tt t go
* * *
(1—214) a (T —G)= B36
For any given initial values of the external debt, governments' debt
and the paths of governments' spending, the system of equations (1—17) —(I—
* 2)solves for the initial period's values of Hand Has well as for
arid for all other periods (t>0). In addition,the
system also solves for the sum of the present values of taxes in each
country. Finally, it is relevant to note that by Walras' Law one of the
equations (I—17)—(I--22) can be excluded.
II. The Impact of Current
In this Appendix
current budget deficits on
(5) of the text (under the
Budget Deficits
we derive the formal solution to the impact of
*
R,W andW.Differentiatingequations (3)— 0 0 *
assumptionthat I =I)yields:
where








The solutions of the system are given in equations (7)—(9) in the text where





















The value of Is:37
Ill.The Impact of Future Budget Deficits ana Steady—State Equilibrium
In Part A of tnis Appendix we derive the formal solutions to the
impact offuturebudget deficits on world rates of interest (short—term and
longterm) and on and W0 ,forthe case in which 1=Y.In Part B we
examine the impact of cumulative budget deficits on the steacy—state values
of interest rates and wealth.



























Equations (Ill—i )and(111—2) specify the world goods market clearing condi-
tions for the present and for the near future periods; and equations (111—3)
and (III—) define the values of domestic and foreign wealth in the present
period, where H1 and H1 denote the values of human capital in the near
future as evaluatea at t=1. Differentiating this systen with respect to
future tax changes and evaluating the solutions around tne point of balanced
budgets and the stationary future (i.e., Y =Y, T =T=G =G
and Y=Y, T1=T=G1=G*), we obtain equations (1o)-(13) in the text.38
B.
The steady—state equilibrium conditions are shown by equations (16)—
(18) in the text. Differentiating these equations around an initial
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In order to compute the effect of Bon the steady—state value of foreign
* g *
wealth,we first note that dW /dB =(dW/dR)(dR/dB )andsince, from
g *
(111—5), dR/dB < 0 ,weonly need to determine the effects of R on W
Differentiating equation (15) in the text yields
* * *
ITT dW—( — .*IR2(R—Iô)— y5(1—IR) Iu U'1(1L
(1—YR)2 (y )2
Asis seen the transmission of domestic past deficits to the steady-state
*
value of foreign wealth may be positive or negative. For example, if R<6
* *
(but still R > i so as to ensure the steady—state) dW /dR < 0 and,
therefore, dW/dB > 0 and the transmission of past budget deficits to
foreign wealth is positive.
The effect of Bg on the steady—state value of domestic wealth is




Differentiating equation (1) in the text yields
(1118) (—.1R2(R—ió)—Yo(i—IR)dR—(1-R)R
= 1mQ—(l_IR)2 (R-Io)2
The second term on the right—hand—side of equation (111—8) does not have a
counterpart in the expression for dW/dBg ; this negative term represents
the direct effect of Bg on domestic wealth which operates through the
necessary rise in steady—state tax collections. sufficient condition for
a decline in domestic steady—state wealth consequent on a rise in 8g is
that 1R2(R—15) > Io(1—R)39
IV.The Solution of the Complete System with 1=1
In this Appendix we examine the properties of the model for the
special case in which the probability of survival is unity. In that case,
with 1=1 ,themarket interest factor equals the effective interest factor,
and the equilibrium conditions are:
(Iv—i) (1—6) +(1_6*)w =
t **t * —
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Equation(Iv—1) describes the requirement that current world demand
equal current world output net of governments' spending, and equation (IV—2)
describes the corresponding requirement for t=1,2 Equation (IV—3)
defines the equilibrium value of domestic wealth. This specification sub-
stitutes government spending, Gt ,fortaxes, ,byusing the government
solvency requirement. The solution of this system is
* — *t
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t* * where = +E > 0 ,andwhere denotes the share of
t=o t=0 * foreignproduct net of government spending, i.e., =
and, At,
aenotes the corresponding share of the home country, i.e.,
x = 1-
Asis evident by inspection of equations (IV—14)—(IV—6), the system
conforms with the Ricardian proposition. Thus, since in present case we
assume that i =1,itfollows that as long as the paths of government
*
spending(which govern the paths of Q and Q )aregiven, the time
patterns of taxes and government debt issues are irrelevant for the
determination of' world equilibrium.
V. The Two—Commodity System
The equilibrium conditions for the system can be obtained as
follows: equilibrium requires that the world market for each good clear.
Using the demand functions, the equilibrium conditions for both goods are:
t
6 * *6 * *
(v—i) (i—6) —+ (— ) — W=x—C a 0 a 0t xt
t
6 * *6*
('/—2) (1—)(i—6) W +1—)(1—6 )— = m G 0t mt
In period 0, a =1and, therefore, the market clearing conditions for t =0
become:




(V—'i) (1—)(1—o) —+ (i—s)(1—o )— = m—
'wherethe values of wealth are




EtatptC Et=0 at. +BBy Jalras' Law we may ignore one of the equitions in the system.
Substituting (V-5)—(V—6) into (V—3)—(v--') yields:
(v7)6(1—6){xEat CmEt=o atPt —B]+
B(1—6){m aPt
+B]=x—G
(V8) (1—B)(1—o)[x Cm t=o aP —B] +
(1_*)(1_ó*)[mt ap —
CE a +B] p0(m -
Wethen multiply both sides of (V—I) by a ,sumbotn sides over allt
(from0 to )andsubstitute (V—5) and (v—6) for and W .There-
sulting equation is then:
(v—9)
aC atp-B] +I atptG a+B]
=(x_G*)a
Equations (V—fl,(V—8)and (V—9) constitute the relevant system. The eco-
nomic interpretation is as follows: Equations (V—7) and (V—8) describe the
equilibrium in tne markets for the two goods in period 0. It is evident
that this is a rational expectations equilibrium since the demand functions
are based on the fully—expected realization of future values of rates of
interestand prices. Equation (V—9) requires that the sum of the present
values of worlddemand forgood x equal the corresponding sum of world
supply. As may be noted we haveused Walras' Law to ignorethe analogous
requirementforgoodrn.
This system is used to solve for the three unknowns: The sum of tne
present value factors in terms of goodx ——I.a;the sum ofthe present
value factors in terms of good m ——apt; and the relative price of
good inin terms of x in the first period —-p.Tnesesolutions can
thenbe used in (V-5) and (V-6) to obtain the values of Wand 4. These
are thesolutions that are reported in equations(27)—(29) in thetext.42
VI.Effects of Fiscal Spenoing in the Two-Commodity System11
In thispartof theAppendix we derive the effects of fiscal
policiesonthereal values of domesticand foreign corisumptions as well as
onreal rates of interest. These results are computed around an initial
equilibrium with zero debt and zero government spending. From equations
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whereD =1—(1—)o—ó> 0 To convert (VI—5) into a logarithmic
derivative we first substitute (VI-6a) for Winto equation (29) in the
text to obtain:)43
(vI-7) =(1)X[1 +(1))]




* Multiplying(vI—8) by(1—f )and subtracting from the logarithmic
* derivativeof Wwith respect to x (obtained from (VI—1) and (Vl—6a)) we
get diog c/dx which is equation (32) in the text, with a minus sign
(since dx =dG).
Analogously, dividing (VI—3) by (vI—6b) yields the logarithmic
derivative of with respect to x ,fromwhich we subtract the product
of (1—8) and (VI-'7), to obtain diog c0/dx which is equation (3)4) in the
text (with a minus sign).
To compute the effects of changes in Gm on real consumption we
first note that from (29) and (V12):
dp * *
(vI-9) =(i-s) +(8-s)(i-o )
m m 822




where J and S are defined in equation (35) in the text. Multiplying
*
(VI-'io)by (1—B ) and subtracting from the ratio of (VI—2) and (VI—6a)
yields equation (33) in the text.
Analogously, dividing (VI—)4) by (vI—3) and subtracting the proauct
of (1—8) and (VI—lo) yields equation (35) in the text.
In computing the effects of domestic permanent fiscal spending on
domestic and foreign real rates of interest we focus on the case in whicn
government spending falls entirely on good x ,i.e.,the case for which
8G =1414
Equation (V—i) in Appendix V (around an initial equilibrium with
zero government spending and initial debt) implies that
t * *
(vI—il =i/x[(1—)ó + (i—o )o W0]
and its logarithmic derivative is:
*










Using (VI—3) and (VI—6b) for d log W /dx ,andusing (VI—1) and (VI—6a) for




Analogously, from equation (V—2) in Appendix V we obtain:
*





* t — (1—)a 0— * t * *
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Using (VI-3) and (vI—6b) for d log W /dx ,andusing (VI-1) and (VI-6a) for




As maybeobserved by comparing (VIi5) with (VI—3), the effect of'
x on the initial price p0 is the same as its effect on the entire path of
prices, Pt .Thisresult reflects the finuing in (vI—13) where it was
shown that the change Qf x does not alter the entire path of interest
rates.
Finally, differentiating logarithmically the real present—value
factors, (p) and (atp) with respect to x ,andusing (VI-13)
and (VI—15), yields equations (14O)—(4O' )inthe text.46
FOOTNOTES
*
Partsof this paper wcre written during the Fall of 1983 while J.A.
Frenke]. was a Fellow at the Sackier Institute for Advanced Studies at Tel—
Aviv University, Israel, and during the winter of 19811 while A. Razin was a
Visiting Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs,
Princeton University. Tne final draft was prepared during the summer of
19811 while both authors participated in the Summer Institute of the NBER.
We are indebted to these institutions as well as to Itzhak Gilboa for
assistance in the computations. In revising the paper we have benefitted
from useful comments by J. Aizenman, C. Calvo, A. Dixit, R. Dornbusch, E.
1-Ielpman, R.E. Lucas, Jr., F. Modigliani, M. Mussa, M. Obstfeld, T.J. Sargent
and L. Svensson. The research reported here is part of the NBER's research
programin International Studies andEconomic Fluctuations. Any opinions
arethose of the authors and not ofthe NationalBureau of Economic
Research.
1Thecomplete model and the various derivations areoutlined in
AppendixI which draws on Frenkel and Razin (19811).
this formulation government spending reduces the resources
available for private sector consumption without yielding utility services.
The interaction between public and private goods in the utility function is
a separate issue, with which we do not deal in the present paper. It is
relevant to note, however, that none of our results are altered by the
introduction of ITusefull? government as a separable argument in the utility
function.
order to compute the long—run values of wealth we use equations
(1—10) and (1—13) of Appendix I, we firstsubstitute RV fora (where
R=1/(1+r)istneconstant steady—state interest factor), and (Y—T) for
tTt);then we take the limit of as t - .Toensure a finite
valueof long—run wealth we assume that R > i since if R < 6
,wealth
is unboundeu. As is evident from equation (l'l) if 1=1 then, If R > 6
wealth shrinks to zero.
11Formally, equation (17) is obtainedby substituting B0 for Bgt
and (T—G) for (T—G) in equation (1—111) In Appendix I; an analogous
procedure underlies the derivation of equation (18).)47
5While it seemslikely that a higher value of domestic government debt
lowers the steady—state value of domestic wealth, we were unable to formally
rule out the opposite outcome.
6The subsequentanalysis draws on Frenkel and Razin (1985a).
7Recall that Q is definedas the value of output net of government
spending; thus, a reduction in government spending is equivalent to a rise
in Q
8Theconstant term I =log +(1—s)log (1-s) as is chosen so as
to simplify, without loss of generality, the subsequent expressions of real
consumption.
9mis specification assumes thatB is denominated in units of good
x. This assumption concerning the indexation of debt may be material when
there are unexpected changes in the terms of trade. In our subsequent
analysis we assume that the initial value of B is zero and, thereby, the
specification of the units of B does not alter our results. In general,
however, such changes may provide for an additional channel through which
government spending impacts on the real equilibrium.
10To gain insight intothe determinants of p0 we note that the
equilibrium price must equate one country's trade balance surplus with the
other's trade deficit or equivalently, the equilibrium price must ensure
that the value of world spending on goods equal the value of worldoutput.
Thus, the equilibrium price pmust satisfy [(1—o)W +G+pG ]
X=pM—[(1_6*)W ++ pG]where the left—hand—side measures the
home country's trade balance deficit and the right—hand—side measures the
foreign country's trade balance surplus. To ensure th3t the market for each
good clears we use the market clearing condition for goou x in period
t=O and substitute for Winto the trade—balance condition. The
solution for pyields equation (29).
11 °
ThisAppendix drawn on Frenkel and Razin (1985o).148
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